The linguistic norm and norm of legal language

Abstract

The concept of norm is a cross-disciplinary one. The norm can be approached using normative and interpretative paradigms. As regards the linguistic norm, there is a debate about the prescriptive norm, which is important for prescriptive linguistics (language cultivation) and pedagogy, and the socio-cultural norm, which is important for descriptive linguistics. The linguistic norm is shaped by language use (usus), language awareness and knowledge-dissemination practices (cultivation), and linguistic prejudices (stereotypes) about language situations, styles, speakers, etc. The linguistic norm also changes historically. There have also been many attempts to define the legal norm. The requirement of clarity in a legal context means that laws must have a regulatory content that is clearly understandable to its addressees.

Introduction: tradition, norm

Norm is a fundamental concept in many disciplines (philosophy, anthropology, ethnography, linguistics, psychology, pedagogy, law, etc.). Norm is closely related to the notion of tradition. The semantic content of the word tradition can be grasped with the notions of permanence, prevalence, cultural transmission, and intergenerational connections. It also includes phenomena such as prejudice, value system, practice, inclination, institution, taste, skill, convention, habit, mentality, paradigm, rank, ritual, style, rule, custom, technique, authority, law, and, of course, norm. Understandably, these can all change over time, but they are an integral, static (only slowly changing)

part of the tradition. The ethnographer László Veres notes in relation to moral norms: “the survival of the elements of traditional community culture was also ensured by objectified norms to which subjects subordinated their behaviour with a binding force.” Tradition and norm play an important role in social behaviour and cooperation. The norm is a set of rules that dictate how to behave in a given situation. The options range from recommended to mandatory, from free choice to prohibitions.

The normative and interpretative paradigms

Starting from Durkheim, until the mid-1960s, sociology and social psychology were dominated by a paradigm that treated norms as objective entities. The only choice individuals had was to accept or reject the norms. This is called the normative paradigm. Since the 1960s, with the rise of pragmatics, the so-called interpretative paradigm has come to the fore, in which the emphasis is on the participants’ collective performance of norm-building and norm-interpreting, with special regard to rules. However, this is only a conceptual framework, because, as Csepeli writes, “in both cases the basic function of social interactions is fulfilled: the orderliness, predictability and protection of social behaviour against disintegrating trends.” This can be seen as a basis from both a cultural linguistic and a legal point of view.

The two types of norm paradigms can be described as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>normative paradigm</th>
<th>interpretative paradigm</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>norm</td>
<td>rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>static</td>
<td>dynamic</td>
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<tr>
<td>a given framework condition</td>
<td>socially constructed behaviour</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The linguistic norm

In the decade following the change of regime in Hungary in 1990, the “norm issue” gained importance in linguistics on several occasions, and even became

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the target of scientific and science-policy debates. The main points of the
“debate on the linguistic norm”: How is the linguistic norm defined? Can
a literary norm be defined? How many linguistic norms are there? If it cannot
be precisely defined, can a norm be referred to in prescriptive linguistics
(language cultivation)?

The questions are legitimate in themselves, but much depends on which of
the paradigms we consider. Indeed, both descriptive and prescriptive linguists
used to speak of an “educated”, “sophisticated”, “model” vernacular form,
and its written version as a “literary” language, according to a previous, static
conception of the norm. This vernacular and literary language was perceived
as a “model” or “norm” of communicative unification. This contrasts with
the interpretative or sociocultural norm.

| model norm | interpretative, sociocultural norm |
| prescriptive | ensures the ability to adapt |
| model | not a model, just an expectation |
| ideal | not an ideal |
| delimitable (contiguum) | process (continuum) |
| fixes | interprets |
| institutionalised | only regulated at community level |

The linguistic norm has been defined by the more modern approach to
prescriptive linguistics, formed in the second half of the 20th century, as
follows:

“The socially valid and accepted rules, guidelines and conventions for the
use of written and spoken language are called linguistic norms. This system
of language use, which is valid for the whole of society, is shaped by social
consensus, by the language of the day. It is not the language habits, the
language tastes (examples) of everyone, not even of the majority, but the habits
and language use of the linguistically more educated, those who use the most
advanced form of the national language, the sophisticated vernacular and the

5 For a fuller summary of the issue see Tolesvai Nagy, Gábor 1998. A nyelvi norma (The
linguistic norm). Akadémiai, Budapest. Nyelvtudományi Értekezések, 144., for linguistic
standards see Balázs, Géza 2000. Lehetséges nyelvi szabványok (Possible language stand-

6 Fábián, Pál–Lőrincze, Lajos 1990: Nyelvművelés (Language cultivation). Mai magyar
nyelvi gyakorlatok IV. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest pp. 128–129.
literary language, that have become, in the course of historical development, the example to follow. (...)

The vernacular norm is in fact an abstraction, not living in its ‘pure’ form in perhaps any Hungarian speaker. But for some linguistic forms, linguistic phenomena, there is no unanimous opinion as to their correctness (the norm). For example, our pronunciation norm is still rather uncertain. There are still uncertainties about the norm in our vocabulary and grammar.

Although the norm in principle presupposes a uniform linguistic behaviour, in reality there are different degrees of conformity to the norm. For example, the norm is stricter and tighter in written than in oral expressions...”

After the linguistic debates, the definition of the linguistic norm was modified as follows

“a system of rules, regularities, that allows the creation and understanding of a text, a sentence, in a language, a language variant, or a speech situation. Language does not have a norm in general, nor can only literary language be considered a norm (as, for example, prescriptive linguistics has long proclaimed), but each language variety and even each community of speakers within a language has its own set of norms. The linguistic norm of each language variety is governed by the values of authority and judgment (> linguistic value). (...) The linguistic norm is usually hidden, i.e., most of the language-using contexts and text types of everyday communication do not have a fixed linguistic norm... (...) The linguistic norm in most languages, including Hungarian, is fixed in the literary language in descriptive grammars, dictionaries, spelling guides (> spelling), and other manuals...”

The Alkalmazott nyelvészeti kisszótár defines linguistic norm similarly

“A set of linguistic and language use patterns established by communities of speakers and/or communities of practice, which exhibit certain regularities and which serve as a reference point in the linguistic interactions between individuals belonging to a given community and between individuals and the community. The linguistic norm is a dynamic, ever-changing phenomenon, shaped by the living use of language (e.g., the current purpose of communication and identity signalling).”

As regards norm-related phenomena that are not always easy to grasp, the *Nyelvművelő kéziszótár*\(^9\) writes as follows under the headword *norm*:

“Even today, we do not have a handbook on pronunciation and intonation norms, we are only familiarising ourselves with the norms governing Hungarian texts (we do not even know how far a multiple compound sentence is normative in a certain type of text, and when it goes outside the norm). Even the largest dictionaries of our national language are only approximately complete and accurate; some parts of our official Spelling Guide are questionable, and there are dubious points in our best grammars, too. (This is necessarily the case in all other languages!) Yet we have no choice but to adapt our speech and writing to them, if our communication situation is such that our fellow speakers and readers can expect us to respect the norms of the national language. It is clear that we cannot consistently speak about a theoretical subject in dialect (for lack of means), nor can we formulate an ethical treatise or a religious sermon in argot or vulgar style.”

The description, of course, exhibits a prescriptivist attitude:

“The unity of our nation is also expressed in the norms of the national language (...). It is the duty of those who have access to both the widest and the deepest linguistic and literary culture to disseminate and cultivate it. By their authority, they also influence these norms...”

Linguistic journals play a major role in the ongoing norm research and norm shaping\(^10\)

The *Retorikai lexikon* tried to summarise the lessons and results of the debates with a rhetorical-prescriptivist attitude

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“The word *norm* means expectation, requirement, rule of conduct, moral rule, customary or official standard. Norm is a concept of social psychology. Norms are what make social life possible. Norms are always formed unconsciously by members of a group. The norms are established and obeyed by the group members to dissolve the anxiety arising from disorder and normlessness (from lack of standards). Each person is a member of many groups (communities), so they are involved in creating and learning many different norms. Globalisation and travel bring with them both the learning and, in part, the clash of different norms. In the technocultural world and in the global space, new forms of communication, language and behaviour are emerging, which, because of their novelty, have no fixed norms and ethics, and therefore create conflicts. Excessive relativity and variability of norms can lead to insecurity, obstruction, and paralysis (frustration). (...) 

A linguistic norm is a set of written and unwritten principles, rules and requirements in a more organised form. It is the linguistic norm that allows a sentence, and ultimately a text, to be constructed and understood. A linguistic norm is always specific to a language, a language variant and a speech situation. The linguistic norm is abstraction. It is necessary to have something to compare it with. Although we talk about a linguistic norm ‘in general’, there are many different norms in everyday language use. The distinction between ideal and usage norms can help us to distinguish between norms. An ideal norm is an imagined or accepted ideal. The Latin word *norm* means: carpenter’s square, rule, pattern. In other words, we compare facts that appear in reality (for example, concrete speech or text) with the norm. It is excessive abstraction to assume a general linguistic norm. The linguistic norm is most commonly used to refer to sophisticated vernacular and literary language (formerly all written texts, now merely the variety of language used by authoritative writers). More recently, the language of the quality press and (in Europe) of the media that embrace public service values can also be seen as a linguistic norm because of its standard, idealistic, exemplary character. Together, these can be called ideal or model norms. In every linguistic situation (speech situation), language variety and community of speakers there are identifiable and describable linguistic rules which form specific local norms. These can be called sub-norms or usage norms.

Grammatical rules are the basis for the rules that define the norm, but they are not sufficient to produce speech that conforms to the norm. In addition to grammatical rules, you also need to know linguistic and social rules and rules of behaviour (or simply: usage rules). These are not called rules in linguistic pragmatics, but rather principles or requirements.

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Both ideal and usage norms are manifestations of a cooperative society, but with different practical purposes and at different levels of functioning, and they are mutually dependent. It is therefore not worthwhile to play them off against each other, as has sometimes been attempted in the last two decades on the basis of what has been called the prescriptive linguistic norm and what has been considered the behavioural descriptive sociolinguistic norm. In the rhetorical approach to the norm, it is primarily the level of publicity that is taken into account, and therefore the rhetorical norm is mostly ideal and prescriptive, although rhetoric has always emphasized the appropriateness to the situation (which is a feature of the norm of use).

In the development of the ideal norm, authority (arguments of authority), also referred to in rhetoric, plays a major role. In other words, the ideal norm is shaped and influenced by authoritative people, communities (groups), institutions (academia, publishing houses, press, media). The norm is shaped by language use (usus), language awareness and knowledge-dissemination practices (cultivation), and linguistic prejudices (stereotypes) about language situations, styles, speakers, etc. Taken together, it is clear that the linguistic norm is the result of historical development and is subject to constant change, and therefore may contain uncertainties and fluctuations (especially in frequently and rapidly changing social systems). Broadly speaking, the main trend in the development of the Hungarian language over the past half millennium has been one of convergence, which has been followed by a century, and especially the last quarter of a century, of divergence. In some areas, this means a change of norms, which results in communication and behavioural uncertainties (disturbances, conflicts).

Certain rules of the ideal or model norm are also set out in writing. The linguistic norm of a vernacular or literary language (more recently: linguistic standard) is contained in descriptive grammars, dictionaries, spelling guides, taught in schools (unless otherwise instructed), and used in the press, media, academic and public life. The rules apply mainly to written texts, but there are also recommendations on the norm for public speaking. The ‘minimum requirements’ for public service radio, which includes rules on speaking, can be considered as such, but all radio and television stations have certain written or unwritten but applied principles on speaking. There are also other strict prescriptive standards, such as diplomatic etiquette, which gives detailed advice on how to speak, or the rules for editing certain press releases (text types) and scientific works.

Rhetoric and linguistics are concerned primarily with the ideal or model norm and with its regulation. Norms of usage or of a narrower scope tend to develop spontaneously and, although they express important situations in life and are appropriate within their scope, they are not usually suitable for all linguistic functions.”
The benefits of the norm debate are the inclusion of multiple approaches to norms, the recognition of degrees and uncertainties; but the passion of the debate has in many ways made prescriptive linguists and teachers, and perhaps parents, uncertain. For if there is no privileged norm, no ideal, then in practice no linguistic form can be blamed; in public language use, no linguistic requirement can be set because there is no set of rules to justify it.

Scientific research can be characterised by the conception and study of any type of norm, but for society we cannot ignore the identification, description and even popularisation of the traditional, culture-bearing, ideal or model norm. A disturbed way of life, values or perceived norms leads to the disintegration of social functions, disorganization, and ultimately even the end of democracy.

The norm of legal language and the requirement of norm clarity

Many attempts have been made to define the concept of a legal norm. Perhaps the Austrian-born American jurist Hans Kelsen dealt with this question in the most detail in his seminal work *Pure Theory of Law*. According to the now well-established definition, a legal norm is an elementary unit of law, a legal command, which, as a model, is structurally composed of three parts: the facts, the disposition and the legal consequence. In this sense, it is not only the legislative act that constitutes a legal norm, but also, Hans Kelsen argued, the decision of a judge or authority as a so-called individual norm addressed exclusively to specific recipients. The requirement of clarity in a legal context means that laws must have a regulatory content that is clearly understandable to its addressees. A fundamental question is, thus, how laws are defined. The answer is found in Article T(2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary which defines laws as “Acts, government decrees, prime ministerial decrees, ministerial decrees, decrees of the Governor of the Hungarian National Bank, decrees of the heads of independent regulatory organs and local government decrees. The expectation of norm clarity applies to all these pieces of legislation and is not limited to the above-mentioned requirement arising from the law on legislative drafting, since the practice of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court has also defined further essential aspects in recent decades. As a starting point, it should be

13 See in this context: *Pokol, Béla: Jogi alaptan (Legal Fundamentals)*. Rejtijel Kiadó; Budapest; 2000 and *Bíró, György–Lenkovics, Barnabás: Általános tanok (General Doctrines)*. Novotni Kiadó; Miskolc; 2010.
14 See in this respect Section 2 (1) of Act CXXX of 2010 on Legislative Drafting.
noted that an essential component of the rule of law is the accountability of public authorities to the laws and the requirement of legal certainty. The latter requirement is also made up of several components. For example, the requirement of the clarity of norm, or access to and comprehensibility of the text of laws, the predictability of the law as a whole and of its individual rules.\textsuperscript{15} Another source of the requirement of clarity is Article 28 of the Fundamental Law, according to which

\begin{quote}
\textquote{in the course of the application of law, courts shall interpret the text of laws primarily in accordance with their purpose and with the Fundamental Law. In the course of ascertaining the purpose of a law, consideration shall be given primarily to the preamble of that law and the justification of the proposal for, or for amending, the law. When interpreting the Fundamental Law or laws, it shall be presumed that they serve moral and economic purposes which are in accordance with common sense and the public good.}
\end{quote}

The wording does not seem to imply a requirement of clarity, but the consistent practice of the Supreme Court has also derived from this rule the requirement that the legislator’s purpose must be made clear in a way that is comprehensible and interpretable to all.\textsuperscript{16} By the way, the definition, which is considered to be an etalon in the domestic legal system, was created by the Constitutional Court, when it stated in 1992 that

\begin{quote}
\textquote{the clear, comprehensible and properly interpretable content of the norm is a constitutional requirement for the normative text. Legal certainty, which is an important element of the rule of law declared in Section 2(1) of the Constitution of Hungary, requires that the text of the legislation must contain a meaningful and clear normative content that can be recognised in the course of the application of the law.}\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

On the basis of all the above, it can be concluded that the violation of the requirement of the clarity of norm may result in non-conformity with the constitution or fundamental law of the piece of legislation. According to the consistent position of the Constitutional Court, unconstitutionality can be established on this ground if the law is uninterpretable for the law

\textsuperscript{15} See in detail ad-hoc decision No. KvK.39485/2022/2 of the Curia, which also summarises the practice of the Constitutional Court.

\textsuperscript{16} See in this context, for example, decision No. Kőf.5.036/2020 of the Curia, i.e. ad-hoc judicial decision No. BH 2021.6.186.

\textsuperscript{17} See Decision No. 26/1992 (30 April) of the Constitutional Court, in which, of course, reference is still made to the former Constitution of Hungary (Act XX of 1949).
enforcer or allows for different interpretations, and as a result the law creates an unpredictable and unforeseeable situation for the addressees, or if the wording of the law is too general, thus allowing for subjective, arbitrary application of the law. 18

Finally, it should be noted that the requirement of clarity is not only violated if the wording of the text of law is difficult or impossible for the addressees to understand, but also if the legal norm suffers from a technical error. A good example of this is the intricate (almost unintelligible) chain of references back and forth within the legislation or outside the norm, or the overly fragmented, unjustifiably layered regulation of the same subject. The normative requirement of the clarity of norm is thus an open-ended general clause, formulated at a high level of abstraction, which has been given substance by judicial practice and which can thus be understood as a complex requirement enforced by the courts, which not only concerns the linguistic formulation of legal norms in the strict sense of the term, but also imposes other requirements, thereby greatly assisting individuals who want to obey the law in navigating the maze of law and ultimately contributing to legal certainty and the rule of law.

A further question is from whose point of view should laws be subjected to a test of clarity of norm. Is there a category of person who is an average literate individual who seeks to obey the law and, if so, what are the criteria for defining such category? Does the requirement of clarity of norm include an expectation that a person (consumer) who is unacquainted with the law but has an average level of education should be able to interpret without particular difficulty the text of the norm to which he must adapt his actions in some area of life? There is no concrete and generally accepted answer to this question in domestic judicial practice, but the European Court of Human Rights has addressed the issue and held that the requirement of clarity of norm is met if the citizen can clearly ascertain the meaning of the norm, at worst with the help of legal advice, and thus is able to judge the consequences of his or her conduct. 19

Therefore, the fact that a citizen does not have the skills or knowledge to understand the text of a norm does not in itself result in a breach of the requirement of the clarity of norm, as no one is excluded from seeking

18 See Decision No. 56/2010 (5 May) of the Constitutional Court.
19 See in this connection paragraph 42 of the judgment of the ECtHR of 25 November 1996 in Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, where the Court states: “The Court recognises that the offence of blasphemy cannot by its very nature lend itself to precise legal definition. National authorities must therefore be afforded a degree of flexibility in assessing whether the facts of a particular case fall within the accepted definition of the offence.”
legal advice. Because of the complexity of real-life circumstances, the legislator cannot always use “plain language”, and such an expectation is not necessarily justified, since, as the Constitutional Court also points out, a legislative text that is too general may become incoherent and open the door to arbitrary application of the law. Therefore, it is a well-established technical solution in law that any gaps in a specific law are filled by principles, which also fulfill the requirement of clarity, while at the same time providing a framework for the interpretation of the law as a whole. Regardless of this, the legislator is of course expected to tailor the text of specific laws as much as possible to law-abiding citizens with an average level of knowledge, i.e., to make the wording only as complex as is strictly necessary with regard to the subject matter of the law. The balance is therefore very delicate, and it is not easy for forensic linguists who, in the context of specific legal disputes, whether on judicial assignment or at private request, sometimes have to take a position on the question of how comprehensible a specific legal text could be to a person of average literacy, or what meaning such a person could attribute to the text. It can still be said that courts typically treat the interpretation of legal texts (e.g., tax laws) as a legal question which they alone have the power to decide, and thus motions for the appointment of a forensic linguist for this purpose are usually rejected. In civil cases, the role of forensic linguists is limited to the interpretation of legal declarations, although here too there is a reluctance on the part of the courts, and it is more the practice of certain authorities (e.g., Hungarian Intellectual Property Office) to take the forensic linguist’s opinion into account when making decisions.

Under the current Civil Code of Hungary, in the event of a dispute, the declaration must be interpreted in the manner in which the addressee must have understood it, having regard to the presumed intention of the declarant and the circumstances of the case, according to the “generally accepted meaning of the words”. This latter phrase creates a justification for the forensic linguist’s expert opinion, as specialised expertise may be required to answer the question of the meaning of a given phrase from the perspective of the average literate consumer. This is why, according to the lawyer author of this study, there is no justification at all for the courts’ dismissive attitude towards linguistic experts, since in other cases they rely on expert opinions even when the subject of the dispute is not a technical issue but a question of law to be decided.

In a broader sense, contracts and unilateral legal declarations (e.g., last wills) are also legal norms, which are subject to the requirement of norm clarity, except that in their case vague wording does not result in a violation
of fundamental law, but leads to the fact that the given contract or declaration will be partially or wholly incapable of producing the desired legal effect. The meaning that the person making the declaration may have attributed to the expressions in the document may therefore be decisive. The identification of the generally accepted meaning of words can be considered as a specialised issue requiring expertise, which may justify the use of a forensic linguist, since according to consistent judicial practice, the ex-post statement of the party concerned, obviously driven by his own interests, is not the relevant one in the context of a legal declaration. It is of course up to the court to draw the legal conclusions, even if a forensic linguist is involved.

Overall, the role of forensic linguists in civil and administrative (e.g., tax) cases is still limited, and they are rarely relied upon by the courts in matters concerning the wording of laws or legal declarations (contracts).\(^{20}\) At the same time, it is clear that the real-life situations to be regulated are becoming increasingly complex, so the legal norms are often incomprehensible even to those with an above-average level of education. Consequently, some kind of linguistic control would be necessary, and this could be achieved by giving forensic linguists a greater role, at least in the codification process in order to promote the requirement of norm clarity.

**Practical areas of norm clarity**

The areas of legal and linguistic clarity are, in particular, the clarity of legislation, the clarity of legal and informative texts (contracts, wills, instructions for use) and the clarity of judicial decisions. This is a common task for the linguist, the lawyer and, if there is a dispute, the forensic linguist, as Balázs Arató (2020) reports in detail.

There are many examples of good practice.

2000. The Hungarian Language Strategy Research Group is set up, one of the aims of which is a programme to simplify legal texts.

2002–2010. Lectures on communication in plain language at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Pécs.

2006. The Office of Hungarian Language Services is set up to organise specific training courses on legal language.

2006–2016. Lectures and training on official and legal language at the Hungarian Academy of Judicial Training

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\(^{20}\) See details on this: Balázs Arató: Quo vadis, igazságügyi nyelvészet? (Quo vadis, forensic linguistics?) in: Magyar Jogi Nyelv 2020/2.; pp. 8–15
2013. A multiannual programme for the simplification of the language of laws launched by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, with recommendations and language training from the Office of Hungarian Language Services.

2013. On 17 January 2013, the President of the Curia established a jurisprudence analysis group to examine the subject of Decision Drafting under Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts. The summary opinion of the analysis group has been made public.\(^{21}\)

2020. Lectures on rhetoric in the courtroom at Budapest-Capital Regional Court (and other regional courts across Hungary).

2022. In a dispute over the use of names, Szeged Regional Court ruled on two conflicting opinions of linguistic experts (including a forensic linguist). The judgment was also published as a document in Magyar Nyelvőr, see: Szeged Regional Court, 2022).

\(^{21}\) https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny.pdf